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D.Z. Phillips 
I. 
In many discussions of grace and works by theologians and philo­
sophers, it is taken for granted that the issue facing us is to give an 
account of the relation which holds or ought to hold between them. 
The senses of the two terms to be related, grace and works are, it 
seems, quite independent of each other. But what if this independence 
is an illusion? What if there are important internal relations between 
grace and works? In that case, to treat grace and works as having 
senses independent of each other, is to fail to mediate the senses of 
grace or works in their religious contexts; it is to ignore the surround, 
ings in which they have their meaning. 
This paper is an exploration of some of the distortions which result 
from the assumption that, in discussing grace and works, our problem 
is that of relating two terms in themselves unproblematic. Through 
the distortion of the reference to works, moral endeavour becomes 
self,interest; through the· distortion of the reference to grace, the 
operation of grace in human life becomes a magical, self, 
authenticating event. 
Before discussing these distortions, it is as well to remind ourselves 
that they may not be avoided even by those who do emphasize the 
need to see belief in the grace of God in a religious setting. John 
Whittaker, in his stimulating discussion of grace and works, reminds 
us of one of these religious settings: 
Man, it is said, wishes to be accepted by a holy and just God. In 
order to be accepted, he endeavours to keep God's commandments. 
His justification before God depends on the merits of his works. Yet, 
if he is honest with himself, he has to admit that he fails in his endea ... 
vours again and again. He has to admit that he is a sinner. But how 
can a sinner be justified b�fore a holy and just God? If his salvation is 
to depend on the merits of his works, he is without hope. Yet, he is 
saved from despair by good news of God's grace. God has elected to 
save the sinner without regard to the believer's good works. Man's 
salvation does not depend on what man has done for God, but on 
what God has done for man. Salvation is the free gift of God's grace. 
Man need not despair at his lack of good works. All he has to do is to 
believe what God has done for him and be grateful for it. 
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John Whittaker is well aware of what happens when belief in the 
grace of Gcxi is made the object of metaphysical speculation divorced 
from its religious context. Bravely, he illustrates this by reference to 
what is generally taken as the extreme form of belief in God's sover­
eign grace, namely, the doctrine of predestination. 
When people have speculated in the abstract about the doctrine 
they have spoken like this: "On the face of it, the doctrine seems . . .  
frightening . . .  since it is terrifying to think that one might be arbitrar­
ily excluded from salvation by divine fiat . . .  Such a God makes all of 
us the victims of an arbitrary destiny, a destiny which seems unspeak­
ably cruel to those who through no fault of their own are left to mis­
ery and damnation. Unless, of course, God somehow foreknows the 
virtues of his elect; but in that case God's foreknowledge seems to 
close our futures in the stifling grip of determinism. How can God 
know what people are going to do in order to reward or punish them 
in advance of their deeds, if it lies within their power to do as they 
please? Or if it does not lie within their power, how can they be said 
to be worthy or unworthy of his grace? And how can God be said to 
be just in dispensing this grace?"1 
According to Whittaker, this is a metaphysical caricature of the 
doctrine, one which it is fatal to entertain on its own terms. What is 
needed is a change of direction which shows the irrelevance of the 
metaphysical arguments. This is what Luther tried to achieve. Whit­
taker tells us that Luther tried to bring out the religious point of the 
doctrine in terms of the fears the doctrine was meant to allay. These 
fears had to do with the question of how a man's soul can be saved if 
he has to rely on his good works. Only by taking this into account car 
we come to see what reliance on God's grace can mean in a believer's 
life. 
In elucidating the development of belief in God's grace in Luther, 
Whittaker reminds us that Luther had been taught "that God's grace 
was freely available, but only to those who were properly repentant. 
Only those who sincerely and completely confessed their failings, and 
who sincerely willed to live according to the law of God, would be 
forgiven and strengthened. For them the sacraments would be the 
over-available means of grace, but for those who lacked or lost a 
properly receptive heart, the sacraments would become ineffectual" 
(pp. 7 1 -72 ). When he reflected on his own life, this became a doc­
trine for despair for Luther, because he had to recognize that he failec 
repeatedly in good works and even in wanting to have a pure heart, 
and the more he tried to have a pure intention, the more artificial the 
very trying made his endeavour seem. On the view with which he wa 
presented, what 'grace' came to was a belief that "God makes up the 
difference between what we intend and what we actually accomplish 
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in the way of doing his will, so that we can actually achieve the right­
eousness needed for salvation" (p. 73 ). 
The doctrine of predestination came as a liberating force to Luther. 
one which rescued him from his despair. What he came to realize is 
that salvation comes from election, that God offers his grace prior to 
anything a man does, "so that it remains only for one to believe in it 
and be grateful for it" {p. 73 ). In this way, Whittaker argues, a harsh 
doctrine was transformed, "for as long as God offers His grace in con­
sequence of the believer's merit, the acutely conscious sinner is left 
without hope. If God grants His grace prior to the sinner's hopeless 
attempts to rectify his impure will, however, then the happiness which 
he could not possess through his own effort becomes possible 
through God" ( p. 7 3 ). Whittaker would claim, I think, that, in this 
way, the doctrine of grace ceases to be a doctrine of fairness and 
becomes a doctrine of love. 
yet, despite the fact that Whittaker wants to show how belief in 
grace enters religious life, he still assumes that we are confronted by 
two separate categories, grace and works, our task being to show how 
they are related. He does not pay enough attention to the need to 
mediate the sense of grace and works by stressing the internal relation 
between them. When this need and emphasis are ignored, the notions 
of grace and works becomes distorted. 
ll 
How does the notion of moral endeavour become distorted? This 
question can be answered by examining accounts which are given of 
the transition from reliance on good works for the salvation of one's 
soul to reliance on divine grace. How does Whittaker characterize this 
transition? He says that prior to his recognition of what God has 
done, the believer performed deeds "for his own self-acceptance", 
whereas after he has recognized what God has done, the believer per­
forms these deeds "out of gratitude" for what God has done for him 
(p. 80). Already we are faced with far-reaching difficulties concerning 
this depiction of good works. Does a man do good works in order to 
save his soul? What if a man says that he jumped into a river to save a 
child from drowning in order to save his soul? Wouldn't it make 
sense to reply: uwe thought you jumped in for the sake of the child"? 
Purity of soul is not achieved by making purity of heart an aim. Purity 
or otherwise is shown in the character of one's actions. Decency does 
not depend on one's actions leading to some further end, salvation, 
contingently related to them. Any goal we have and any means used in 
the pursuit of it must be answerable to the claims of decency. 
Whittaker also thinks that the transition from reliance on works to 
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reliance on grace does not come about ( t  when one professes his belief 
in divine foregiveness without undergoing any change in his disposi­
tion . . .  such a believer either does not understand what he believes 
or does not really believe" (p. 81 ). But what brings about the trans-. 
formation? Whitta.k.er's answer, in the main, is in terms of what he 
believes 
to be the self-defeating character of reliance on good works as 
a means of saving one's soul. Whittaker shows how Luther's attempts 
to po6SCSS a pure heart were self-defeating. The more he tried, the 
more he despaired. That this should be so is not surprising since, 
according 
to Whitta1cer, LuthCt' is in a confused state: CtLuther was 
like one who on some grievous occasion tries to feel appropriately 
saddened, but in trying to feel sad feels only unnatural and insincere" 
( p. 72 ). The confusion consists in thin.king that one can be sad by try­
ing to be sad. Whittaker seems to equate Luther's despair with the 
confusion involved in the self-defeating attempt to attain righteous­
ness by making righteousness an end to which one's actions are sup­
posed to be the means. A transition from a state of reliance on good 
works, to a state of reliance on divine grace, involves, for Whittaker, 
freeing oneself from a state of conceptual confusion. 
The obvious difficulty with Whitta.k.er's analysis is that the man 
who is in despair about his moral endeavours need not be conceptu­
ally confused in the way Whittaker describes at all. On the contrary, 
he may be clear .. sightedly free of such confusion. Consider one of 
Simone Weil 's examples of a pure action, that of a father absorbed in 
play with his children. Another father may recognize that he is not 
like th.is. But he may also see quite clearly that he can never become 
like this by making spontaneous absorption in play with his children 
an end which he can aim for. He cannot plan to be spontaneous! He 
appreciates the confusion involved in that. But he is dejected never­
theless, and so his dejection does not depend on the confusion. A 
man may be dejected simply because of what he is. This being so, 
there are difficulties for the way in which Whittaker wants to describe 
the distinctive liberation which comes to a man who comes to rely on 
divine grace. That distinctive liberation cannot be said to consist essen. 
tially in seeing that moral purity cannot be made the goal of moral 
endeavour. That recognition would make a transition from a confu .. 
sion about a regard for decency to a clearer view of it. The attainmen· 
of such clarity need not lead to any sense of reliance on divine grace 
and so certainly cannot be equated with a transition to such reliance. 
Neither, as we have seen, is it a necessary condition of such a transi­
tion, since neither the man who endevours to be decent nor the man 
who comes to rely on divine grace need ever have been confused in 
the way Whittaker describes. 
Whittaker should have come to these conclusions too, for in his 
account of the transition from a concern with prudential considera, 
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tions to a concern with moral considerations, he himself is aware of 
the possibility of a conception of moral endeavour which does not 
exhibit a self-defeating character. Whittaker shows how futile it 
would be to attempt to demonstrate, according to some common 
measure of interest, that moral considerations serve men's interests 
more than prudential considerations. Whittaker argues, rightly, that 
"as long as the point of moral principles is to override . . .  prudential 
considerations by instituting prescriptive judgments of obligation, the 
moralist cannot afford to defend his principles on his opponent's 
grounds. The moral believer would defeat his own purpose if he set 
aside the point of his principles merely to win their acceptance on 
prudential grounds, for the acceptance of these principles as prudent 
policies would not require the believer to exercise any higher ideals. 
Such a believer would not enter into any new, peculiarly moral domain 
of judgment. Without adhering to moral beliefs as the foundation for 
a different kind of reflection, beyond prudential reasoning, he simply 
would not become a dutiful person. And for all those who believe 
that we have moral duties, that makes no sense at all" (p. 88). Here, 
the recognition of moral duties, as described by Whittaker, does not 
exhibit a self -defeating character. Moral duties need not be thought of 
as the means by which the end of moral purity is achieved. 
On the other hand, given this realization by Whittaker with regard 
to a concern for decency, his further characterization of the transition 
from reliance on moral endeavour to reliance on grace becomes pro­
blematic: "Rather than chinking that his ultimate happiness and fulfilment 
might be secured as the end,product of moral achievement, the beliewr fore, 
goes the whole range of mean/ ends judgmen.ts in connection with his hap pi, 
ness" (p. 82 ). But in his account of the transition from a concern with 
prudence to a moral concern, Whittaker's whole point was that mor­
ality, unlike prudence, should not be construed in terms of conduct 
determined by the relation of means to ends. The difficulty is that 
Whittaker characterizes coming to rely on divine grace as the giving 
up of a conception of morality which, elsewhere, he says is a confused 
conception of morality. 
What remains true is that when these confusions are put aside, a 
man may be said to express concern about his moral failings. It also 
remains true that for many people reliance on divine grace has some­
thing to say to such a concern. What it has to say must remain unre­
solved for Whittaker, for, as we have seen, his own answer relies on 
attributing a self-defeating character to moral endeavour which it need 
not possess, and which he, at times, seems to realize it does not poss­
sess. Whittaker's analysis of reliance on good works suffers precisely 
because he has severed the notion of good works from that of grace. 
Ironically, though stressing the need to see the transition from 
reliance on works to reliance on grace in its religious context, 
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Whittaker's analysis of the first stage of the transition suffers pre­
cisely because he presents it in isolation from the sense of reliance on 
grace. If their senses are inter-dependent, ignoring the fact, unsurpris­
ingly, leads to confusion. 
III 
We cannot see what is said to be religiously suspect in relying on 
good works for one's salvation without reference to the notion of 
grace. But neither can we understand the notion of grace by ignoring 
its internal relation to good works. Flannery O'Connor has said, " . . .  
you cannot show the operation of grace when grace is cut off from 
nature".2 
At times, Whittaker is aware of the danger involved. He points out 
that Luther called the doctrine of predestination "strong meat", not 
to be given to those not ready for it. One way of not being ready for 
the doctrine would be to divorce it from everything in Luther's life 
which led up to his embracing of the doctrine. If we take aware the 
consciousness of sin, if we take away the heavy conscience and the 
threat of despair, then, when we are told that God has already pres­
cribed for man's salvation "so that it remains only for one to believe 
in it and to be grateful for it" (p. 73 ), those words may take on a veq 
different meaning. We may find people saying that they can do what 
they like, since God has made salvation secure for them anyway. 
Here, the sense of the notion of grace is unmediated. Whittaker uses 
the example not simply to illustrate religious and theologial foolish­
ness, but to show, philosophically what speaking of the sense of a 
doctrine amounts to. When the surroundings of a doctrine are muti­
lated, the sense of the doctrine is mutilated at the same time. 
Whittaker realizes that the insistence on grace as a free gift from 
God is meant to take us away from a self-calculating religion of deser 
In an attempt to put the matter beyond all such dangers, the doctrine 
of predestination says that God's election was made "before the 
foundations of the world were laid". Yet, as Whittaker realizes, this 
theological assertion, in practice, so far from ridding men from pru­
dential considerations, served to reinforce them. If prudential consid 
erations are coupled with the thought that divine rewards and pun­
ishments have already been determined, people may well grow 
anxious over whether they are included among the beneficiaries. Des 
pite the fact that God's election is said to be done "before the found 
tions of the world were laid", believers begin to search frantically fo1 
signs of their election. A great deal of time and energy is then spent i 
determining who is in and who is out in the sight of God. In fact, 
some have said that they are in by the grace of God. Others have 
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denied that such talk has anything to do with God's grace. In Flannery 
O'Connor's story "Revelation" , a character who thanks Jesus for 
making everything just the way it is, giving herself and her husband a 
little of everything and the good sense to use it right, is told by 
another character, "Go back to where you came from, you old wart 
hog from hell". So there are religious disputes and judgements con­
cerning what is due to the grace of God. 3 The result of talk of reliance 
on divine grace, then, may have the exact opposite of the liberating 
effect it is supposed to have. 
In wanting to get away from a calculating religion of desert, theolo­
gians often stress that God's free gift of grace has nothing to do with 
men's endeavours. All men have to do is to recognize what God has 
done and be grateful for it. But what does this amount to? This is one 
of the issues which bothered Pelagius. If there is only a contingent 
connection between the recognition and the gratitude, the door is 
opened to highly embarrassing conclusions. If a man is in prison, 
normally, he will be glad to hear that someone has secured his release. 
But this need not lead to any change in his behaviour or any sense of 
gratitude to the person who releases him. On the contrary , the 
released person may take up the life which led to his imprisonment 
and regard the one who set him free as a soft-hearted fool. 
Pelagius did not think that talk of God's grace is intelligible without 
reference to good works. He did not think such works should be des­
pised. As Flannery O'Connor observes, Manichean-type theologies 
see "the natural world as unworthy of penetration ".• But this is tan­
tamount to refusing to mediate the sense which the notion of grace 
may have. In saying, mistakenly, that a man's soul could be saved by 
his good works, Pelagius was wanting to avoid confusions not dissimi­
lar to those to which Whittaker calls our attention. He wanted to 
avoid a magical conception of grace or religious experience which is 
quite cut off from moral conduct. It is for the same reason that 
Flannery O'Connor says "Today's reader, if he believes in grace at all, 
sees it as somethin� which can be separated from nature and served to 
him raw as Instant Uplift. "5 So although their doctrines are diametri­
cally opposed to each other , Luther and Pelagius want to avoid magi­
cal conceptions of grace unmediated in the detail of the believer's life. 
In its most extreme form a believer could be said to recognize what 
God has done for him but be completely indifferent to it, or even to 
live a life contrary to God's commands. Perhaps he could even say 
with impunity, "If God has done all that is necessary already why 
should I bother?" 
Clearly, Whittaker wants to avoid these unhappy conclusions. He 
sees the dangers involved in trying to speak of reliance on works or 
reliance on grace while ignoring the internal relations between them. 
He tries to move in this direction when he says that the doctrine of 
divine grace is expressed less misleadingly if we say "that the grace by 
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chronologicaU,, prior to our efforts to attain it,, (p. 85 ). In other 
words, instead of thinking of the relation between grace and works in 
terms of temporal priorities, we should endeavour to see how a 
notion of grace may inform a conception of moral endeavour from 
the outset. Unfortunately, Whittaker's analysis stands in the way of 
doing this; it prevents him from bringing out the internal relation 
which may exist between grace and worlc.s. 
IV 
To do justice to the internal relation between grace and works we 
must give up the assumption that we begin with two unproblematic 
categories, grace and works, and are only faced subsequently with the 
task of establishing a relation between them. The same assumptions 
may mislead us in connection with the belief in the inscrutable will of 
God. In this context, too, a certain picture holds us captive. We think 
we begin with two unrelated terms, God and the world, and then, via 
some kind of cosmological argument, attempt to establish a relation 
between them. What needs to be recognized is how, in certain reac­
tions to the world, a conception of the world may be informed from 
the outset by a notion of the will of God; the world will be seen, frorn 
the outset, as God's world. 
Similar lessons need to be learned in discussions of the relations 
between grace and works. Again we need to explore the possibility of 
a conception of human endeavour being informed, from the outset, 
by a conception of God's grace. In the case of someone who comes to 
a reliance on God's grace, what he comes to is a conception of human 
endeavour so informed. The conception of God's grace gets its sense 
in certain reactions to human endeavour. In taking account of these 
reactions we are noting the importance of concept-formation where 
the notion of grace is concerned. 
One way of bringing out a natural context for the notion of divine 
grace is to show its close connection with the notion of the inscruta­
ble will of God. In moments of extreme peril, such as being in a storn 
at sea, a person may say that his life is in God's hands. God's will will 
be made manifest in his survival or destruction as it is in the raging 
storm. The notion of God's will gets its sense in the context of such 
reactions. Contrast this with the view that primitive man responds in 
this way because of a prior conclusion he has reached, namely, that 
because he is not responsible for the storm, someone else, greater 
than himself, must be responsible.6 On this view, the reactions in the 
storm are a ronsequence of previously held beliefs. Such a view ignore: 
concept-formation in religious belief. I am arguing that the sense of 
belief in God is itself rooted in reactions such as reactions to the 
9
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storm. It is in such contexts that belief in God has its sense. 
The sense of such reactions is held fast by all that surrounds them. 
That is what separates them from other reactions in the storm which 
may amount to no more than a cry in the darlc, a desperate need for 
comfort. On the other hand, we could imagine rites developing 
around such reactions of terror which, so far from seeking comforting 
reassurances, seelc to celebrate the contingency of human life through 
its expression in what is terrible. Imagine a rite in which children 
dance around a pit of fire. The wizard points at one of the children 
and immediately the child is thrown into the pit. One minute dancing, 
the next consumed in the flames: life is in the hands of a terrible God. 
The examples I have given of reactions in situations of great peril 
are quite consistent with the general description of man bowed in sub­
jection before the inscrutable and arbitrariness of God's omnipotent 
will. If any outcome, good or evil, is an expression of God's will, is 
not the only rational reaction one of resigned acceptance of whatever 
happens? How is it possible for notions of divine grace to be born of 
such contexts? "All things come from God" seems to mean no more 
than "What happens, happens". Surely, the only justifiable response 
is an undifferentiating resignation. 7 
May I say at once that my aim is not to deny the possibility of such 
a reaction. What I would object to is its claim to be a rationalistic the­
sis which denies the possibility of reactions other than its own. What 
is needed is attention to the ways in which concepts are formed in fact 
in reactions of other kinds. A sense of being at the mercy of God's 
will can, as I have shown, lead to terror. It is also true, however, that 
.it can give rise to a certain lcind of wonder; wonder at the miracle of 
existence, at the fact that anything exists at all. In such a reaction, the 
very contingency of the events takes on the aspect of a gift - a gift of 
srace one might say. But this does not come about by a rational argu­
Jnent from the contingency of things to the notion of the grace of 
, God. The impression of such argument is created by Whittaker when 
be says, "Sheer existence, with all its mysterious givens and disturbing 
contingencies, must have some higher rationale, some end that rend-
1 ers individual existence worthwhile and capable of fulfilment. This is 
. the theme on which the world's religions play their different varia­
tions. The point of postulating a higher order in the cosmos is to legit-
imate the individual's search for a worthwhile end in his own exist­
ence" (p. 60). Here we are back with the view that religious reactions 
are legitimated by the beliefs which precede them. The man in awe 
before the majesty of God's will in the circumstances I have described 
pn hardly be characterized as someone who postulates a higher order 
5 '1 the cosmos in order to legitimate his own worthwhileness. His rea­
tions are not based on prior beliefs; rather, his beliefs get their sense 
Ip the context of these reactions. Furthermore, his awe at the majesty of 
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God's will, so far from establishing his own worthwhileness, shows 
him that he is as nothing before Goo. He may well remember the man 
who planned a vast expansion in barn building, not knowing that God 
required his soul that very night. 
The vulnerability of human beings is an important element in the 
formation of the notion of divine grace. Like the elements of the 
storm, human beings too are seen as in the hands of Goo. To see peo.. 
pie in this way, as themselves creatures dependent on grace, is to see 
them as beings who should not be subject to plans for appropriation 
and exploitation. To see men as Goo's creatures is to deny at the same 
time that others should play at being Goo with respect to them. In 
this way, coming to see people as Goo's creatures is inextricably 
bound up with one's own conduct. It is no accident that wondering at 
God's creation, seeing others as Goo's creatures is closely linked to 
dying to the self, since malcing the self central would be a denial of the 
religious sense I have been trying to elucidate. Of course, faith is not 
an all-or-nothing affair. The self continues to intrude in countless 
ways, so that the struggle to believe is a common feature of religious 
belief. That is why there is constant need for confession and repent­
ance. What would be problematic, however, would be to say that 
someone recognized life as a gift of Goo's grace in the absence of an1 
of these religious states or attitudes I have referred to, ranging from 
faithful acceptance to sorrowful repentance. 
The picture of an acknowledgement of Goo's grace, completely 
divorced from any showing forth of works of any kind is therefore a 
confused picture. It is important to realize, however, why it is con­
fused. It is not confused because the possession of divine grace cau­
sally brings about the good works. It is not confused because the good 
works are a natural consequence of the acknowledgement of divine 
grace. Rather, I have been arguing, that the sense of acknowledgement 
of divine grace is bound up with the dispositional changes I have 
talked about. There is an internal conceptual relation between them. 
In this matter, Kierkegaard shows a commendable religious realism: 
'Forgive, and JOU will also be forgiven. ' Meanwhile one might 
nevertheless manage to understand these words in such a way 
that he imagined it possible to receive forgiveness without his 
forgiving. Truly this is a misunderstanding. Christianity's 
view is: forgiveness is forgiveness: your forgiveness is your 
forgiveness; your forgiveness of another is your own forgive­
ness: the forgiveness which you give your receive, not con­
trariwise that you give the forgiveness which you receive. It is 
as if Christianity would say: pray to God humbly and believ­
ing in your forgiveness, for he really is compassionate in such 
a way as no human being is; but if you will test how it is with 
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respect to forgiveness, then observe yourself. If honestly 
before God you wholeheartedly forgive your enemy (but 
remember that if you do, God sees it ), then you dare hope 
also for your forgiveness, for it is one and the same. God for, 
gives you neither more nor less nor otherwise than as you 
forgive your trespassers. It is only an illusion to imagine that 
one himself has forgiveness, although one is slack in forgiving 
others.8 
Kierkegaard must not be read as saying that God forgives as a con, 
sequence of moral conduct, since it is essential to remember that, for 
Kierkegaard, the act of forgiveness itself is a produce of grace; a for, 
giveness before God. Thus we are brought full circle to the central 
contention concerning the internal relation between grace and works. 
v 
Hopefully, we are not in a position to see what was wrong with the 
picture of the philosophical search for clarity as the attempt to esta� 
lish a relation between two independently intelligible categories: grace 
and works. We see the confusions which come into Whittaker's anal, 
ysis if we are in the grip of this picture. The sense of 'reliance on good 
works' and 'reliance on grace' remains unmediated in the analysis. On 
Whittaker's view, in the transition from one form of reliance to the 
other , works cease to be the means of attaining salvation ( 'Look at 
what I have done') and become the means by which gratitude to God 
is shown ( 'Look at what he has done').  On this view, there is no 
change in the conception of good works, and grace seems something 
magical, quite independent of them. In the religious possibility I have 
elucidated, grace transforms the very conception of a person's endea­
vours, not by making them the means of achieving something differ­
ent from what was achieved before, but by seeing the possibility of the 
works themselves as the gift of grace. This is what I take Paul to be 
emphasizing to the Ephesians in those words so often victim of 
incomplete quotation: "By grace are ye saved through faith, and that 
not of yourselves, it is the gift of God. Nor of works, lest any man 
should boast." (Here, those who want to separate grace from works 
usually end their quotation, but Paul continues) "For we are his 
workmanship created in Christ Jesus unto good works which God 
hath before ordained that we should walk in them". Here there is no 
issue of bridging a gap between grace and works, since grace informs 
one's very conception of human endeavour. Such a perspective indeed 
changes one's whole attitude to works, attainment, failure, praise, 
blame, judgement, pity, compassion and forgiveness. Simone Weil 
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shows us what is involved when she illuminatingly locates Peter 's 
denial of Jesus, not in the brealcing of his promise, but in the making 
of it. "Denial of Saint Peter. To say to Christ: 'I will never deny Thee• 
was to deny him already, for it was supposing the source of faithful­
ness to be in himself and not in grace. "9 Peter thought that his loyalty, 
his allegiance, his faith, were entirely within his control, the product 
of his purposeful endeavours. What Jesus reveals to him is that even 
his ability to make the promise is in the hands of God, dependent on 
grace, on factors over which he has little control. Hence, when some­
one is guilty of denial, as Peter was, the believer's response is, "But 
for the grace of God, there go l".  The opposite response is the sin of 
pride: "God, I thank thee that I am not as other men are", which is 
what Peter was saying in effect in his confident prediction that no 
matter who deserted Jesus, he never would. In this way, his promise 
to be faithful was already an act of unfaithfulness, a denial of grace. 
All I have said about an internal relation between grace and works 
can be spoken of in the way in which Whittaker speaks of Luther's 
faith. He says that it "ultimately rested on the new vista of under­
standing which opened up when he grasped the point of this belief 
and took it to his heart. Any other way of 'grounding' this belief by 
detaching its credibility from the role it plays as a principle would 
have been completely illogical" (p. 82). This insight is not regarded as 
an achievement or another form of salvation by desert. The insight 
itself is regarded by the believer as a work of grace, the work of God 
in him. That is why such a believer would say, with Paul, "Not I, but 
Christ who dwelleth in me". 
I agree entirely with Whittaker when he says, "A doctrine like that 
of predestination acquires its point by virtue of the role it plays in 
reorienting the judgements a believer makes" (pp. 85-86). I am less 
happy with what Whittaker takes to be the central concern of these 
judgements, namely, the believer and his prospects for happiness. 
Theologically, I may be taken as making a plea to emphasize Gods 
electing to save, rather than God saving the elect. If this is done, the 
place of the self is determined as a consequence. Thus a higher order 
is not postulated in order to legitimize an individual's search for what 
is worthwhile (Whittaker), but, rather, faced with the mediated real­
ity of God's grace, what is worhtwhile for the individual is determined 
thereby. Why such grace is revealed at all remains, as it must, a neces­
sary mystery. This priority takes more seriously Whittaker's own 
recognition that the doctrine of predestination plays a supporting role 
to "the more fundamental doctrine of divine grace" (p. 84 ). 
VI 
Despite my plea to emphasize God's electing to save, rather than God 
saving the elect, I do not want to be taken as issuing theological 
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prescriptions. My main concern has been with the conceptual confu­
sions which result from a failure to mediate the sense of the notions 
of grace and works; a failure which leads, as we have seen, to a distor­
tion of moral endeavour and to a magical conception of grace and 
religious experience. It is in this context that a final point has to be 
made. Whittaker has emphasized, rightly, that we cannot see the point 
of a religious belief if we divorce it from the role it plays in the reli­
gious life. He goes on to claim, however, that "one can see how a 
faithful adherence to such a belief depends entirely on a grasp of its 
point" (p. 70). Here we part company. 
Let us assume that I philosophically, have succeeded in showing the 
point of stressing an internal relation between grace and works. If this 
is all a faithful adherence to belief depends on, then, my e�ition, if 
faithful, amounts to faithful adherence to the belief. But, surely, 
Whittaker would not be happy with this. By 'adherence to belief' he 
clearly means adherence to it in one's life. The equation of such faith­
ful adherence to philosophical or even theological analysis will not do. 
Something is missing. Furthermore we have reason to suppose that 
Whittaker, on reflection, would know what is missing, for he gives us 
the answer elsewhere in his essay. In describing Luther's faith, Whit­
taker tells us that it depended, not simply on Luther grasping its 
point, but also on his taking it to his heart ( p. 82 ). The philosopher 
who strives for some measure of clarity concerning the transition 
from reliance on works to reliance on grace, may or may not make 
such a transition his own; may or may not take it to his heart. To say 
that reliance on divine grace has a certain conceptual character is not 
to rely on divine grace. To receive such grace the philosopher would 
have to confess "I have arrived at my analysis by the grace of God". 
That confession is not made simply in writing his paper. 
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